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1  Introduction 
Roberto  Perotti's  paper  is an  ambitious  effort  to  shed  light  on why  dif 
ferent  empirical  methods  lead  to varying  conclusions  about  the  effects 
of  government  spending  on  key  economic  variables.  Perotti's  previous 
work  used  vector  autoregressions  (VARs)  and  found  old-fashioned  Key 
nesian  effects  of  government  spending.  In  contrast,  my  previous  work 
used  dates  of  exogenous  military  buildups  based  on  narratives  and 
found  neoclassical  effects  of  government  spending.  Numerous  others 
have  used  these  two  types  of methods,  with  similar  results.  In  this  cur 
rent  paper,  Perotti  critiques  the military  date  method,  answers  critiques 
I have  made  of  the  VAR  method,  and  uses  the  VAR  identification 
method  to estimate  multiple  variations  over  different  time  periods  and 
countries.  He  also  analyzes  industry-level  input-output  data. 
I  wholeheartedly  agree  with  Perotti  that  the question  asked  in  this pa 
per  is crucial  to our  basic  understanding  of how  the  economy  works.  Ex 
ante,  it seems  that  a  consensus  could  easily  be  reached,  since  unlike  the 
case  of  technology  shocks  we  actually  have  data  on  government  spend 
ing. Unfortunately,  finding  a consensus  on  this  issue  is proving  to be  just 
as  elusive  as  in  the  case  of  technology  shocks.  I do  not  think  this  paper 
will  settle  the  issue,  for while  I applaud  his  efforts  to  try  to  find  robust 
results,  I  will  ultimately  disagree  with  his  conclusion. 
In  my  discussion,  I  will  begin  by  providing  some  background  to help 
readers  who  have  entered  this  debate  midstream.  I  will  then  argue  that 
it  makes  sense  to  focus  on  defense  spending  rather  than  other  compo 
nents  of  government  spending.  I  will  then  assess  Perotti's  critique  of my 
method  as well  as  assess  his  defense  of his method.  I  will  argue  that both 
methods  have  weaknesses,  but  that  the  weaknesses  of  the  VAR  ap 
proach  are  potentially  more  problematic.  In particular,  I highlight  re 238  Ramey 
suits  from  a new  paper  showing  that  allowing  for differences  in  timing 
in  the VAR  reverses  the  consumption  results.  Finally,  I  will  show  that his 
input-output  results  are  due  entirely  to  the  classification  of  two  com 
puter  industries  in defense.  Thus,  while  impressed  with  the  volume  of 
new  results,  I do  not  find  them  to be  convincing  evidence  for  the  pres 
ence  of  old-fashioned  Keynesian-style  effects  of  government  spending. 
2  Background 
The  old-fashion  Keynesian  model  predicts  that  an  increase  in govern 
ment  spending  will  lead  to  a  rise  in  output,  hours,  consumption,  and 
real wages.  The  neoclassical  model  offers  the  same  predictions  for  out 
put  and  hours,  but  disagrees  on  the  predictions  for  consumption  and 
real wages.  In particular,  the neoclassical  model  predicts  that  the  same 
negative  wealth  effect  that  raises  labor  supply  should  also  lower  con 
sumption.  Moreover,  the  increase  in  labor  supply  should  be  accompa 
nied  by  a  lower  product  wage  in  the  short  run  (Baxter  and  King  [1993]). 
Interestingly,  the new  Keynesian  model  also  predicts  that  consumption 
should  fall,  since  in  that model  agents  are  assumed  to choose  consump 
tion  optimally.  It is only  when  one  returns  to an  old  Keynesian  assump 
tion  of  "rule-of-thumb"  consumers  that  one  can  obtain  an  increase  in 
consumption  in  the model  (Gali,  Lopez-Salido,  and  Valles  [2007]). 
Ramey  and  Shapiro  (1998)  estimated  the effects  of government  spend 
ing  by  identifying  exogenous  and  unanticipated  increases  in military 
spending.  To  do  this,  they  used  a narrative  approach  and  chose  dates 
when  Business  Week  suddenly  predicted  a  large  increase  in government 
spending  due  to exogenous  political  events.  The  dates  chosen  were  the 
Korean  War  in  1950,  the Vietnam  War  in  1963,  and  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  at  the  end  of  1979.  Using  a dummy  variable  that  took  the 
value  of unity  for each  of  these  dates,  Ramey  and  Shapiro  found  that  the 
increase  in government  spending  raised  output,  hours,  nonresidential 
investment,  interest  rates,  and  the  relative  price  of manufactured  goods, 
while  it  lowered  consumer  durable  purchases,  nondurable  consump 
tion,  residential  investment,  and  various  measures  of  real wages.  Sub 
sequently,  Edelberg,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (1999),  Burnside,  Eichen 
baum,  and  Fisher  (2004),  Cavallo  (2005),  and  Eichenbaum  and  Fisher 
(2004)  have  used  these  military  dates  in a variety  of  specifications  and 
robustness  tests  and  have  found  similar  results.  More  recent  work  has 
also  added  9/11  as a fourth  date  (e.g.,  Eichenbaum  and  Fisher  [2004]  and 
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Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002)  used  a VAR  approach  instead  to  identify 
government  spending  shocks.  While  they  used  a structural  VAR  method 
for  identifying  tax  shocks,  their  government  spending  shocks  were 
identified  using  a  standard  Cholesky  decomposition  in  which  it  was  as 
sumed  that  government  spending  did  not  react  within  the  quarter  to 
GDP,  and  so on.  Perotti  uses  the  same  technique  in the  current  paper  and 
finds  results  similar  to  the  earlier  ones.  In  this  framework,  an  increase  in 
government  spending  raises  both  nondurable  consumption  and  real 
wages. 
What  accounts  for  the  different  results?  The  military  dates  method 
differs  from  the VAR  shocks  in at  least  four ways:  (1)  the military  dates 
are  few  in number;  (2)they  capture  only  one  type  of  government  spend 
ing?military  spending?which  is  widely  and  nationally  perceived;  (3) 
they  apply  only  to  increases  in  government  spending,  not  decreases; 
and  (4) their  timing  is based  on  the historical  record  of news  rather  than 
on when  the  spending  actually  occurs.  Most  of Perotti's  critiques  of  the 
military  date  method  center  on  (1).  My  critique  of  the VAR  method  has 
previously  focused  on  point  (4)  (Ramey  [2006]).  Thus,  a  good  part  of 
Perotti's  current  paper  addresses  these  two  points.  I  will  also  discuss 
point  (2) as  another  potential  crucial  difference  between  the  two meth 
ods. 
3  Why  We  Should  Focus  on Defense  Buildups 
As  discussed  before,  the military  date  methods  focuses  only  on  defense 
spending,  whereas  the  recent  VAR  methods  have  focused  on  total  gov 
ernment  spending  or  government  consumption  spending.  I  will  present 
two  arguments  for why  it  makes  sense  to  focus  on military  spending. 
First,  to  distinguish  theories,  it  is very  important  that we  consider 
types  of  government  spending  that  do  not  affect  the  aggregate  produc 
tion  function.  If government  spending  is  socially  productive,  then  the 
net  effect  may  be  a positive  wealth  effect,  which  can  increase  consump 
tion  and  real wages  even  in  the  neoclassical  model.  Military  spending, 
particularly  in  the U.S.  context,  is  ideal,  since  it has  negligible  direct  ef 
fects  on  the  aggregate  production  function.  What  other  types  of  spend 
ing  does  the government  undertake?  Table  3C1.1  shows  the  composition 
of  government  purchases  by  function  in  1959  and  2005  (earlier  data  are 
not  available).  Defense  spending  was  almost  50 percent  of  total  govern 
ment  purchases  in  1959  and  25 percent  in 2005.  Perotti  uses  government 
consumption  expenditures  plus  defense.  As  the  table makes  clear,  fed 240  Ramey 
Table  3C2.1 
Consumption  of Government  Purchases  (Percent,  Nominal  Terms  from  NIPA  Table  3.17) 
By Function:  1959  2005 
Defense  49  25 
Nondefense  Investment  14  13 
Federal  Nondefense  Consumption  9  11 
State  and  Local  Nondefense  Consumption  28  51 
S&L  Consumption  Spending  on  Education  13  24 
S&L  Consumption  Spending  on  Public  Safety, 
Health,  and  Economic  Affairs  11  16 
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Figure  3C2.1 
Real  Per  Capita  Government  Spending 
eral  nondefense  consumption  is a  trivial  part  of  government  spending. 
On  the  other  hand,  state  and  local  nondefense  consumption  is  more  im 
portant,  equal  to 51  percent  in 2005. Moreover,  most  of  the  spending  is 
on  public  education,  health,  and  public  safety.  It  is very  possible  that 
these  other  categories  of  government  spending  have  direct  productive 
effects  on  the  economy,  and  hence  are not  the  types  of  shocks  we  seek  in 
order  to distinguish  models. 
Military  spending  also  accounts  for  the  bulk  of  fluctuations  in  gov 
ernment  spending.  Figure  3C2.1  plots  per  capita  defense  spending  as 
well  as per  capita  total  government  spending  and  consumption  govern 
ment  spending.  Except  for  an  upward  trend,  almost  all  of  the  variation 
in government  spending  is due  to military  buildups.  The  vertical  lines 
denote  the Ramey-Shapiro  dates,  augmented  with  9/11.  Defense  spend 
ing  goes  up  dramatically  after  each  date,  with  Korea  being  by  far  the Comment  241 
biggest  shock  in  the post-WWII  period.  The  defense  buildups  continue 
to be  evident  in  total  government  spending,  shown  in  the  graph  on  the 
right.  The  other  fluctuations  are minor  blips  in comparison. 
Based  on  this  evidence,  I am  led  to  two  conclusions.  First,  the military 
buildups  are  the major  source  of  shocks  to  total  government  spending. 
Korea  is particularly  important  and  should  not  be  omitted.  Eliminating 
the Korean  War  period  from  a study  of  the  effects  of  government  spend 
ing  shocks  makes  as much  sense  as  eliminating  the  1990s  from  a  study 
of  the  effects  of  information  technology.  Second,  most  of  the  other  fluc 
tuations  represent  state  and  local  spending  on  possibly  productive  ac 
tivities  such  as  education,  and  thus  are not  the  sorts  of  shocks  we  should 
be  studying  for  the  exercise  at hand. 
4  Perotti's  Critique  of  the Military  Date  Method 
Perotti's  principle  critique  of  the military  date  method,  which  uses  cur 
rent  and  lagged  values  of  one  set  of  dummy  variables  for  the  four major 
military  buildups,  is  twofold.  First,  he  argues  that  the methodology  im 
poses  the  constraint  that  the dynamic  responses  of  the  endogenous  vari 
ables  must  be  the  same  across  all  four  periods.  He  argues  that  each 
episode  may  have  been  associated  with  different  tax  policies.  Indeed, 
his  critique  is potentially  valid  but  it applies  equally  to his  preferred  VAR 
method.  Both  methods  impose  the  constraint  that  the  dynamic  response 
of  the  endogenous  variables  to  shocks  is  the  same  across  the  sample. 
Both  methods  study  the average  response  to  a  shock.  Thus,  this  critique 
cannot  be  used  as  a basis  for preferring  the VAR  methodology  over  the 
military  date  methodology. 
Perotti  then  goes  on  to  estimate  a new  specification  of  the military 
date  method  (DV3)  that  allows  the  dynamics  to  change  across  the  four 
buildups.  He  does  this  by  defining  four  separate  dummy  variables.  He 
then  criticizes  this  new  proposed  method,  appropriately  so,  by  arguing 
that  it assumes  that  the  shock  to each  variable  during  the  start  of  a  mili 
tary  buildup  consists  entirely  of  the military  buildup  and  allows  no 
shocks  from  other  sources.  Also,  as he  points  out,  this method  is very  im 
precise.  I agree  with  his  critique  of his  own  new  DV3  method.  The  stan 
dard  method  is preferable  because  it does  not  suffer  from  this  problem. 
To  see  an  example  of  the problems  associated  with  Perotti's  DV3  pro 
cedure,  consider  his  analysis  of  the  behavior  of  taxes,  which  he  claims 
supports  his  conclusions.  Using  his  DV3  method,  he  finds  that  tax  rates 
declined  during  the Vietnam  War  (figure  3.2). One  has  only  to  look  at  the 242  Ramey 
average  marginal  tax  rate  series  from  figure  8  in Edelberg,  Eichenbaum, 
and  Fisher  (1999)  or  the  capital  and  labor  income  tax  rates  in  figure  1 of 
Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (2004)  to  see  that  Perotti's  DV3  pro 
cedure  gives  counterfactual  results. 
To  summarize,  Perotti's  critique  of  the military  date  method  also  ap 
plies  to  the  VAR  method  and  thus  does  not  cause  us  to  prefer  one 
method  over  the  other.  His  proposed  alternative  DV3  method  is even 
more 
problematic. 
5  Potential  Timing  Problems  with  the VAR  Method 
In Ramey  (2006),  I argued  that  the  differences  in  results  from  the VAR 
method  and  the military  date  method  could  be  due  to  timing.  To  see  this, 
suppose  that  the  government  announces  an  increase  in  government 
spending  a  few  periods  before  it actually  occurs.  According  to  the neo 
classical  model,  consumption  and  the  real wage  should  fall  immedi 
ately,  and  then  recover  partially.  If one  uses  a VAR  to  identify  the  shock 
from  the  actual  path  of  spending,  then  one  only  sees  consumption  and 
the  real wage  when  they  are  rising  after  the  initial  fall.  I supported  these 
arguments  both  with  specific  examples  of  the  lags  in government  spend 
ing  after  the  decision  to build  up  the military  and with  Granger  causal 
ity  tests. 
In  this  paper,  Perotti  tries  to  respond  to  this  critique.  First,  he  shows 
that when  the Korean  War  period  is  eliminated  the military  dates  no 
longer  Granger-cause  the VAR  shocks.  My  response  is  two-fold.  First, 
eliminating  the  Korean  War  period  simply  reduces  the  power  of  the 
tests.  Second,  even  without  the Korean  War  period,  the military  dates 
still Granger-cause  the defense  spending  component  of  the VAR  shocks. 
Perotti's  second  response  is  to  use  the  Congressional  Budget  Office 
(CBO)  forecasts.  This  idea  is nice  in  theory,  but  has  little  power  in prac 
tice  because  these  forecasts  (1) are  available  only  from  1984  on;  (2) are 
only  available  semiannually;  and  (3)  only  apply  to  federal  spending. 
Thus,  the  finding  that  they  do  not  Granger-cause  the VAR  residuals  is 
very  weak  evidence  in  favor  of  the VAR. 
I  was  surprised  that  Perotti  did  not  try  to defend  the VARs  by  using 
the  Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002)  robustness  check  for  the  timing  issue. 
In  their  earlier  paper,  Blanchard  and  Perotti  allowed  for  the  possibility 
that  the  shocks  identified  by  the VAR  were  known  one  period  in  ad 
vance.  However,  they  only  applied  this  check  to  the  effect  on  output. 
What  happens  if one  applies  this  check  to consumption?  A  recent  paper Comment  243 
by  Tenhofen  and Wolff  (2007,  abstract)  does  just  this  and  finds  that  "con 
sumption  falls  in  reaction  to  an  expenditure  shock  once  the model  al 
lows  for  one-period  ahead  anticipation  of  this  shock."  Thus,  it appears 
that  the  inability  of  the  standard  VAR  to get  the  timing  right  is the  source 
of  the  finding  of  the  increase  in  consumption.  This  result  leads  us  to 
doubt  all  of  the  VAR  results  he  shows  that  claim  that  a  government 
spending  shock  leads  to an  increase  in consumption.  These  apply  to  the 
post-WWII  quarterly  results,  the  annual  historical  results,  as well  as  the 
international  results. 
To  summarize,  Perotti's  defense  against  the  timing  issue  is  rather 
weak,  and  Tenhofen  and Wolff's  application  of  Blanchard  and  Perotti's 
own  method  shows  that  changing  the  timing  in  the  VAR  by  just  one 
quarter  reverses  the  consumption  results. 
6  Industry  Evidence  from  Input-Output  Tables 
In  section  8, Perotti  turns  to  industry  evidence  to distinguish  whether 
government  effects  are more  neoclassical  or Keynesian.  To  see why  in 
dustry-level  evidence  can  shed  light  on  this  issue,  consider  the  demand 
for  labor  curve  for  industry  i: 
W.  -JL  = 
AitFL(Lit,Kit)  '  it 
where  W/P  is the  real  product  wage,  A  is total  factor  productivity  (TFP), 
L  is  labor  input,  K  is  the  capital  stock,  and  FL is  the marginal  product  of 
labor. According  to  the neoclassical  demand  curve,  if  A  and  K  are  held 
constant,  then  an  increase  in L  must  be  accompanied  by  a decrease  in the 
real  product  wage. 
Perotti  seeks  to cast  doubt  on  the neoclassical  production  function  by 
showing  that  both  hours  and  real wages  increased  in  the  industries  that 
received  the  greatest  increase  in defense  spending  during  the Vietnam 
War  and  the Carter-Reagan  buildup.  He  shows  that most  of  the  top  ten 
receiving  industries  experience  an  increase  in both  hours  and  the  real 
product  wage  during  the  buildups.  These  results  stand  in  contrast  to 
some  of my  previous  findings  on  the  effects  of  defense  spending  on  real 
wages.  For  example,  figure  3C2.2  is a  modification  of  a graph  shown  in 
Barth  and  Ramey  (2001).  It shows  that  real  product  wages  fell  in  the  air 
craft  industry  just  as  defense  spending  was  increasing  dramatically. 
Why  are Perotti's  results  so different?  There  are  several  problems  with 
his  analysis.  First,  his  timing  for  the Carter-Reagan  buildup  is  wrong.  He 244  Ramey 
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Figure  3C2.2 
Defense  Purchases  and  Real  Product  Wages  in Aircraft 
compares  1977  to  1982.  In  fact, most  of  the  increase  in military  prime 
contracts  occurred  after  1982, which  can  also  be  seen  in the Barth-Ramey 
graph.  Second,  it is not  surprising  that  real wages  in defense  industries 
would  increase,  even  with  an  increase  in hours.  As  the  previous  equa 
tion  shows,  an  increase  in both  hours  and  the  real wage  contradicts  neo 
classical  theory  only  if both  A  and  K  are  constant.  However,  from  1963 
to  1967  real wages  grew  12 percent  in all  private  business.  As  long  as A 
and  K were  increasing  at  a  similar  rate  to  the  rest  of  the  economy,  then 
an  increase  in real wages  is not  inconsistent  with  the neoclassical  view. 
The  third,  and most  important  reason,  for  the difference  appears  to be 
due  to  the  classification  of  two  key  industries.  In particular,  Perotti  clas 
sifies  semiconductors  and  electronic  computing  equipment  as  indus 
tries  in  which  the  change  in government  spending  was  a big  share  of  to 
tal  shipments.  These  two  industries,  however,  are  huge  outliers  among 
all  of  the  industries.  In particular,  while  the  average  annual  growth  rate 
of  labor  productivity  from  1958  to  1996 was  2.5  percent  for  all  industries 
in  the NBER  database,  the  annual  growth  rate  of  labor  productivity  was 
16 percent  for  semiconductors  and  almost  19 percent  for electronic  com 
puting  equipment!  It is clear  that  the  unusually  high  rate  of  technologi 
cal progress  in  these  industries  would  cause  real wages  to  increase  even 
if the  government  suddenly  raised  its demand  for  their  products. Comment  245 
The  extraordinary  behavior  of  these  two  industries  turns  out  to account 
for  all of  Perotti's  results.  To  demonstrate  this,  I performed  the  following 
experiment.  Using  the  same NBER  productivity  database  used  by  Perotti, 
I defined  a defense  dummy  variable  equal  to unity  if  the  industry  was 
listed  in Perotti's  table  3.4.1  then  ran  regressions  of  annual  growth  rates  of 
hours,  capital,  and  real product  wages  on  the defense  dummy  variable,  as 
well  as  year  fixed  effects,  for  the  buildup  periods  1965-1967  and  1980 
1987.1  found  that  the  defense  industries  had  significantly  higher  growth 
of hours,  capital,  and  real wages,  consistent  with  Perotti's  finding.  How 
ever, when  I redefined  the defense  dummy  variable  to omit  semiconduc 
tors  and  electronic  computing  equipment,  I found  that while  hours  and 
capital  growth  rates were  still  significantly  higher  in defense  industries, 
real  product  wage  growth  was  not.  Thus,  classifying  the  two  extremely 
high  productivity  industries  as defense  accounts  for Perotti's  findings. 
7  Conclusions 
Neither  of  the  leading  methods  for  identifying  government  spending 
shocks  is without  its flaws.  The  military  date  method  suffers  from  few 
episodes,  whereas  the VAR  method  suffers  from  potential  timing  prob 
lems.  Despite  a  large  set  of  empirical  results,  the present  paper  does  not 
resolve  the  issue.  Unfortunately,  the  critique  of  the military  date  method 
offered  by  Perotti  applies  equally  to  the VAR method.  I  have  argued  that 
his  proposed  new  DV3  method  is even  more  problematic  than  the  stan 
dard  method.  The  defense  of  the  timing  of  the VARs  is weak,  and  the 
new  results  by  Tenhofen  and Woolf  (2007)  cast  doubt  on  every  VAR  es 
timated  in this paper.  The  input-output  analysis  is promising,  but my  in 
vestigation  suggests  that  the  results  are  due  to  the  extraordinary  pro 
ductivity  growth  experienced  by  the  two  computer  industries  he 
included  in  the  defense  category. 
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